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Assuming that oligopolistic downstream firms take intermediate goods prices as given and
that upstream and integrated firms choose their quantities first and simultaneously, this note
shows that vertical mergers between upstream and downstream firms are procompetitive.
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It has long been recognized that vertical mergers beneﬁt consumers if they eliminate the
ineﬃciencies due to double marginalization that are characteristic of industries with an
upstream and a downstream monopoly.1 In a setup where non-integrated downstream
and non-integrated upstream ﬁrms compete oligopolistically amongst themselves and
with vertically integrated ﬁrms2, Salinger (1988) showed that the eﬀects of a vertical
merger on consumer welfare are ambiguous: If the number of downstream and upstream
ﬁrms is reduced and the number of integrated ﬁrms is simultaneously increased by the
same number, then consumer welfare can either increase or decrease. These potentially
anticompetitive eﬀects of vertical mergers are commonly thought to be due to strategic
foreclosure of the intermediate goods market by integrated ﬁrms.3
Two assumptions in Salinger’s paper can be perceived as debatable. First, although
downstream ﬁrms exert market power on the downstream market, they act as price
takers on the intermediate goods markets. Riordan (2008, footnote 37) suggests one
way out of this inconsistency: If upstream ﬁrms ﬁrst and simultaneously choose their
capacities and then set prices on the intermediate goods market, input prices will be ﬁxed
for downstream ﬁrms once they place their orders on the intermediate goods market.
Second, Salinger (1988, p.349) assumes that upstream ﬁrms move ﬁrst and integrated
and downstream ﬁrms move second. Therefore, a vertical merger in Salinger’s setup has
two eﬀects. It eliminates some ineﬃciencies due to double markups and it changes the
ratio of ﬁrms who move ﬁrst and second.
In this note, I refer to mergers that only have the former eﬀect as vertical mergers
that eliminate double markups and I analyze the impact of such mergers on consumer
welfare. Assuming that upstream and integrated ﬁrms move simultaneously, I show that
the eﬀects of vertical mergers to eliminate double markups are unambiguously procom-
petitive under fairly general assumptions about ﬁnal goods demand. This leads me to
conclude that the ambiguous eﬀects in Salinger’s model are entirely due to the assump-
tion of sequential moves. If nonintegrated upstream ﬁrms diﬀer from integrated ﬁrms
only in that they cannot access the downstream market directly, then a vertical merger
is unambiguously procompetitive.
2 Model
There are D downstream ﬁrms, U upstream ﬁrms and I integrated ﬁrms, indexed d =
1,..D, u = 1,..,U and i = 1,..,I, respectively. The only diﬀerence between upstream
ﬁrms and integrated ﬁrms is that upstream ﬁrms cannot access the ﬁnal goods market
directly and have to sell to downstream ﬁrms on the intermediate goods (or wholesale)
market. Both upstream ﬁrms u and integrated ﬁrms i ﬁrst simultaneously choose their
capacities ku and ki at the constant marginal cost c ≥ 0. There are no other costs
1See e.g. Spengler (1950).
2I use the convention that downstream and upstream ﬁrms are by deﬁnition not integrated and
vertically integrated ﬁrms are called integrated ﬁrms.
3See e.g. Salinger (1988), Riordan (1998, 2008) or Rey and Tirole (2007).
2of production.4 Throughout, I assume that integrated ﬁrms do not participate on the
wholesale market.5 Instead, each integrated ﬁrm i is committed to sell its capacity ki on
the ﬁnal goods market at the market clearing ﬁnal goods price. Similarly, each upstream
ﬁrm u is committed to sell its capacity ku at the market clearing wholesale price.
Given the input price pW, which they take as given, downstream ﬁrms d buy quanti-
ties qd, which they will sell, together with the integrated ﬁrms, on the ﬁnal goods market
at the market clearing price P(Q + KI), where Q ≡
PD
d=1 qd and KI ≡
PI
i=1 ki are the
aggregate quantities sold, respectively, by downstream and integrated ﬁrms and where
P(.) is the inverse ﬁnal goods demand function satisfying P(0) > c, P ′ < 0,P ′′ ≤ 0 and
P ′′′ ≤ 0. Alternatively, and loosely, P ′′′ must not be too big.6 I use the notation ki,k−i
and KI to denote, respectively, the capacity of the integrated ﬁrm i, the aggregate capac-
ity of all integrated ﬁrms other than i and the aggregate capacity of all integrated ﬁrms.
Analogous notation is used for all other ﬁrms’ quantities and capacities. Throughout, I
focus on symmetric equilibria meaning that ﬁrms of the same type play the same action
in equilibrium.
3 Preliminaries: Equilibrium
I ﬁrst derive the aggregate quantity traded Q by downstream ﬁrms as a function of
the wholesale (or intermediate goods market) price pW and of the aggregate capacity of
integrated ﬁrms KI, which are both given to them. So the typical downstream ﬁrm d
maximizes [P(qd + q−d + KI) − pW]qd over qd, which yields the ﬁrst order condition






where Q ≡ qd+q−d = Dqd. Solving for pW gives the inverse demand function P W(Q,KI)
to which the upstream ﬁrms sell on the intermediate goods market, where the argument
KI highlights its dependence on the aggregate capacity of integrated ﬁrms:
P





























4The constant marginal cost assumption is made to make comparison with Salinger (1988) straight-
forward. All of the results will go through with (weakly) increasing marginal costs of capacity. The
assumption that downstream ﬁrms face no other costs than the wholesale price is made to ease the
exposition. All results will be unaﬀected if downstream and integrated ﬁrms face an additional constant
marginal cost δ ≥ 0.
5This assumption is the same as made by Salinger (1988, p.349).
6Both P′′ ≤ 0 and P′′′ ≤ 0 are only suﬃcient conditions for the analysis to go through. Particularly,
the assumption P′′′ ≤ 0 is never close to being tight, as will become clear below. However, it is also
clear that any alternative nice, general and suﬃcient condition is hard to come up with.
3where arguments have been dropped and where the second inequality holds if P ′′′ is
not too large. A suﬃcient condition for this is P ′′′ ≤ 0, which has been assumed for
convenience.7
Consider next the capacity choice by integrated ﬁrms. The typical integrated ﬁrm
i maximizes [P(ki + k−i + KU) − c]ki over ki, where KU ≡
PU
u=1 ku is the aggregate
quantity sold by upstream ﬁrms to downstream ﬁrms who then sell it on the ﬁnal goods





where KI = ki + k−i = Iki and K ≡ KI + KU.8 Similarly, the typical upstream ﬁrm u
maximizes
[P
W(ku + k−u,KI) − c]ku =
￿
P(ku + k−u + KI) + P






over ku. The corresponding ﬁrst order condition can be written as
KU =
DU[P(K) − c]
−P ′(K)(D + U + 1) − P ′′(K)KU
, (4)
with KU = ku + k−u = Uku.
Lemma 1 The unique symmetric equilibrium outcome is characterized by the unique






−P ′(K)(D + U + 1) − P ′′(K)KU
(5)
is the unique aggregate capacity for any given D,U and I. Moreover, KI > 0 and
KU > 0.
Proof: Concavity of P(Q) and P W(Q,KI) in Q implies 0 >
dKI
dKU > −1 and 0 >
dKU
dKI > −1.9 Therefore, a unique pair (KI,KU) solving (3) and (4) exists. Moreover, the
solution values KI and KU are strictly positive because P(0) > c. ￿
4 Comparative Statics
The question of interest is how K changes as I increases and D and U simultaneously
decrease by dI. That is, letting D = ND − I and U = NU − I be the number of










7If downstream ﬁrms faced an additional per unit cost δ, the inverse wholesale demand function
would simply be PW
δ (Q,KI) = PW(Q,KI) − δ.
8If integrated ﬁrms faced an additional per unit cost δ for the ﬁnal goods production, their capacity
would be given by KI(δ) =
I[P(K)−c−δ]
−P ′(K) .
9The derivation is straightforward, though somewhat tedious.
4The focus is on vertical mergers that do not eliminate all downstream ﬁrms nor all
upstream ﬁrms, so I will assume ND −I > 1 and NU −I > 1 and henceforth neglect any
integer constraints.














−P′(K) is positive. The fraction preceding dK/dI is strictly negative
because P ′′ ≤ 0. Hence:
Lemma 2 dK
dI ≤ 0 implies
dKI
dI > 0.
With D = ND − I and U = NU − I, aggregate capacity of upstream ﬁrms is
KU =
(ND − I)(NU − I)[P(K) − c]
−P ′(K)(ND + NU − 2I + 1) − P ′′(K)KU
. (7)
Before determining the eﬀects of I on KU, I have to determine the sign of
dKU
dK since this
term will show up when totally diﬀerentiating KU with respect to I. From here onwards,




= (ND − I)(NU − I)
￿
P ′[−P ′(ND + NU − 2I + 1) − P ′′KU]
[−P ′(ND + NU − 2I + 1) − P ′′KU]2
+
P ′′(ND + NU − 2I + 1) + P ′′′KU + P ′′ dKU
dK
[−P ′(ND + NU − 2I + 1) − P ′′KU]2
)
.




To derive the overall eﬀect of changes in I on KU, it is convenient to analyze the direct





[2I − (ND + NU)][P − c]
−P ′(ND + NU − 2I + 1) − P ′′KU
+
−2P ′[P − c](ND − I)(NU − I)
[−P ′(ND + NU − 2I + 1) − P ′′KU]2.






P ′(ND − 1)(NU − 1)[−P ′(ND + NU − 2I) − P ′′]
[−P ′(ND + NU − 2I) − P ′′KU]2
dK
dI
− [P − c](ND − 1)(NU − 1)
[−P ′′(ND + NU − 2I) − P ′′′KU − P ′′ dKU
dK ]




The fraction in the ﬁrst line preceding dK/dI is negative. Under the assumption that
dI > 0 implies dK < 0, dKU/dK > 0 holds by Lemma 3. Hence, if dK/dI < 0, the
5fraction in the second line preceding dK/dI is positive if P ′′′ is not too big. Therefore,
under the assumption dK/dI < 0,
dKind
U
dI > 0 will hold. We know already that dK/dI < 0
implies dKI/dI > 0. Therefore, the only way dK/dI ≤ 0 could occur is that the negative
direct eﬀect present in the ﬁrst term in dKdir
U /dI somehow outweighs the opposite eﬀects
present in all the other terms. I am now going to show that this is not the case by showing
that in aggregate the ﬁrst and negative term in the direct eﬀect on KU and the direct





(P − c)(−P ′ − P ′′KU)
(−P ′)[−P ′(ND + NU − 2I + 1) − P ′′KU]
> 0.
The following proposition summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 1 Vertical mergers that eliminate double markups are procompetitive.
5 Discussion
The diﬀerence between the result obtained in the present model and the one in Salinger’s
setup is quite striking. This diﬀerence is due to his assumption that upstream ﬁrms move
ﬁrst and integrated and downstream ﬁrms move second, while here upstream and inte-
grated ﬁrms are assumed to move simultaneously and ﬁrst. Consequently, the implication
for antitrust policy and legislation is that vertical mergers should be treated more per-
missively than Salinger’s analysis suggests if the main diﬀerence between upstream ﬁrms
and integrated ﬁrms resides in the latters’ capability of directly accessing the downstream
market rather than in the order in which they move.
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